HOW TO COUNT SINS


THE number of sins a person may commit is well-nigh incalculable, which

is only one way of saying that the malice of man has invented

innumerable means of offending the Almighty--a compliment to our

ingenuity and the refinement of our natural perversity. It is not

always pleasant to know, and few people try very hard to learn, of what

kind and how many are their daily offenses. This knowledge reveals too

nakedly our wi
kedness which we prefer to ignore. Catholics, however,

who believe in the necessity of confession of sins, take a different

view of the matter. The requirements of a good confession are such as

can be met only by those who know in what things they have sinned and

how often.



There are many different kinds of sin. It is possible by a single act

to commit more than one sin. And a given sin may be repeated any number

of times.



To get the exact number of our misdeeds we must begin by counting as

many sins at least as there are kinds of sin. We might say there is an

offense for every time a commandment or precept is violated, for sin is

a transgression of the law. But this would be insufficient inasmuch as

the law may command or forbid more than one thing.



Let the first commandment serve as an example. It is broken by sins

against faith, or unbelief, against hope, or despair, against charity,

against religion, etc. All these offenses are specifically different,

that is, are different kinds of sin; yet but one precept is

transgressed. Since therefore each commandment prescribes the practice

of certain virtues, the first rule is that there is a sin for every

virtue violated.



But this is far from exhausting our capacity for evil. Our virtue may

impose different obligations, so that against it alone we may offend in

many different ways. Among the virtues prescribed by the first

commandment is that of religion, which concerns the exterior homage due

to God. I may worship false gods, thus offending against the virtue of

religion, and commit a sin of idolatry. If I offer false homage to the

true God, I also violate the virtue of religion, but commit a sin

specifically different, a sin of superstition. Thus these different

offenses are against but one of several virtues enjoined by one

commandment. The virtue of charity is also prolific of obligations; the

virtue of chastity even more so. One act against the latter may contain

a four-fold malice.



It would be out of place here to adduce more examples: a detailed

treatment of the virtues and commandments will make things clearer. For

the moment it is necessary and sufficient to know that a commandment

may prescribe many virtues, a virtue may impose many obligations, and

there is a specifically different sin for each obligation violated.



But we can go much farther than this in wrongdoing, and must count one

sin every time the act is committed.



"Yes, but how are we to know when there is one act or more than one

act! An act may be of long or short duration. How many sins do I commit

if the act lasts, say, two hours? And how can I tell where one act ends

and the other begins?"



In an action which endures an hour or two hours, there may be one and

there may be a dozen acts. When the matter a sinner is working on is a

certain, specified evil, the extent to which he prevaricates

numerically depends upon the action of the will. A fellow who enters

upon the task of slaying his neighbor can kill but once in fact; but he

can commit the sin of murder in his soul once or a dozen times. It

depends on the will. Sin is a deliberate transgression, that is, first

of all an act of the will. If he resolves once to kill and never

retracts till the deed of blood is done, he sins but once. If he

disavows his resolution and afterwards resolves anew, he repeats the

sin of murder in his soul as often as he goes through this process of

will action. This sincere retraction of a deed is called moral

interruption and it has the mysterious power of multiplying sins.



Not every interruption is a moral one. To put the matter aside for a

certain while in the hope of a better opportunity, for the procuring of

necessary facilities or for any other reason, with the unshaken purpose

of pursuing the course entered upon, is to suspend action; but this

action is wholly exterior, and does not affect the will. The act of the

will perseveres, never loses its force, so there is no moral, but only

a physical, interruption. There is no renewal of consent for it has

never been withdrawn. The one moral act goes on, and but one sin is

committed.



Thus, of two wretches on the same errand of crime, one may sin but

once, while the other is guilty of the same sin a number of times. But

the several sins last no longer than the one. Which is the more guilty?

That is a question for God to decide; He does the judging, we do the

counting.



This possible multiplication of sin where a single act is apparent

emphasizes the fact that evil and good proceed from the will. It is by

the will primarily and essentially that we serve or offend God, and,

absolutely speaking, no exterior deed is necessary for the

accomplishment of this end.



The exterior deed of sin always supposes a natural preparation of sin--

thought, desires, resolution,--which precede or accompany the deed, and

without which there would be no sin. It is sinful only inasmuch as it

is related to the will, and is the fruit thereof. The interior act

constitutes the sin in its being; the exterior act constitutes it in

its completeness.



All of which leads up to the conclusion, of a nature perhaps to

surprise some, that to resolve to sin and to commit the sin in deed are

not two different sins, but one complete sin, in all the fulness of its

malice. True, the exterior act may give rise to scandal, and from it

may devolve upon us obligations of justice, the reparation of injury

done; true, with the exterior complement the sin may be more grievous.

But there cannot be several sins if there be one single uninterrupted

act of the will.



An evil thing is proposed to your mind; you enjoy the thought of doing

it, knowing it to be wrong; you desire to do it and resolve to do it;

you take the natural means of doing it; you succeed and consummate the

evil--a long drawn out and well prepared deed, 'tis true, but only one

sin. The injustices, the scandal, the sins you might commit

incidentally, which do not pertain naturally to the deed, all these are

another matter, and are other kinds of sins; but the act itself stands

alone, complete and one.



But these interior acts of sin, whether or not they have reference to

external completion, must be sinful. The first stage is the suggestion

of the imagination or simple seeing of the evil in the mind, which is

not sinful; the next is the moving of the sensibility or the purely

animal pleasure experienced, in which there is no evil, either; for we

have no sure mastery over these faculties. From the imagination and

sensibility the temptation passes before the will for consent. If

consent is denied, there is no deadly malice or guilt, no matter how

long the previous effects may have been endured. No thought is a sin

unless it be fully consented to.



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